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THE WASTE WAR: OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS, INC. 
V. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
Edward A. Fitzgerald* 
The United States generates a great deal of solidI waste.2 There is, 
however, a diminishing number of facilities available for the disposal 
of this waste.3 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has es-
timated that 80% of the existing solid waste landfills will be closed by 
the year 2009.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that "[g]en-
erating solid waste has never been a problem," but "[f]inding environ-
mentally safe disposal sites has."5 
Some localities have addressed the landfill shortage by transporting 
their municipal solid waste across state lines for disposal, a viable 
* Edward A. Fitzgerald, J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science, Wright State 
University. 
1 Solid waste is defined as: 
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, waste supply treatment 
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 
mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not 
include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials 
in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to 
permits ... , or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 as amended. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988). 
2 The EPA has estimated that: 
over 11 billion tons of waste are generated every year from the following sources: At 
least 250 million tons are subtitle C hazardous wastes; 180 million tons are municipal 
wastes; 7 billion tons are industrial process wastes; and 4 billion tons are mining wastes, 
oil and gas wastes and other large volume wastes. 
S. REP. No. 301, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992). 
:l Id. at 5; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NEXT 
FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE? 1 (1989) [hereinafter OTAl; see also S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 22-24 (1985). 
4 S. REP. No. 11, supra note 3, at 22-24; OTA, supra note 3, at 1; see also S. REP. No. 301, 
supra note 2, at 5. 
5 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 
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solution for various practical and economic reasons. In many cases, 
major cities are located near a state border, and the closest disposal 
facility may lie across the state line. In other cases, "temporary" 
shortages of disposal capacity in the generating state force dumpers 
to seek landfills in other states. Additionally, differences in landfill 
standards in out-of-state facilities can lead to lower disposal fees and 
offer an economic incentive to transport waste across state lines.6 
Finally, the trend toward larger, regional disposal capacity has in-
creased the volume of both interstate and intrastate waste shipmenU 
In 1992, approximately nineteen million tons of the two hundred 
million tons of municipal solid waste generated in the United States 
crossed state lines for disposal or incineration.8 Sixteen states were 
net importers of waste, twelve states were net exporters, and only 
one state was not involved in interstate transfers of waste.9 Four 
states exported more than one million tons; five states received more 
than one million tons. lO New York, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wash-
ington accounted for over half of all municipal solid waste exports, 
while Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana accounted for over half 
of all municipal solid waste importsY 
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan 
Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 367 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
6 The National Governors Association (NGA) pointed out that: 
from 1982-1989, landfill tipping fees have increased 149 percent nationally, with the 
greatest increase occurring in the last two years. The increases are most noticeable in 
areas with dwindling capacity, such as the Northeast. The National Solid Waste Asso-
ciation 1988 tipping fee survey found regional disposal costs of $45.48 [per ton] in the 
Northeast, $17.95 [per ton] in the Midwest, $15.87 [per ton] in the South, and $13.06 
per ton in the West .... As tipping fees increase in areas with shrinking disposal 
capacity, lower fees found in other regions of the country (such as the Midwest) tend 
to attract out-of-state shipments. 
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, CURBING WASTE IN A THROWAWAY WORLD: REPORT 
OF THE TASK FORCE ON SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 38--39 (1990) (citation omitted) [herein-
after CURBING WASTE]. 
7 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF MUNICIPAL SOLID 
WASTE 7 (1993); see S. REP. No. 52, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1995). 
H H.R. REP. No. 720, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1994). 
" Id. 
10Id. 
11 Id. According to a 1993 report from the National Solid Waste Management Association: 
[i]nterstate shipment of waste grew by four million tons, an increase of more than 25 
percent, between 1990 and 1992. Currently, about 15 million tons of municipal waste is 
exported; 47 States, the District of Columbia, the Canadian provinces of Ontario and 
British Columbia, and Mexico exported some portion of their municipal solid waste for 
disposal in the contiguous United States in 1992; 44 States import some municipal solid 
waste for disposal; 4 States (New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Missouri) and the 
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There is an ongoing controversy over whether state and local gov-
ernments have the authority to impose restrictions on the disposal of 
solid waste generated outside their jurisdiction.12 Some states and 
local communities worry that imported municipal solid waste will 
frustrate their ability to handle their own municipal solid waste.13 
These states and local communities view imported solid waste as 
exhausting landfill capacity that was created at a great political ex-
pense.14 Furthermore, many states do not wish to become dumping 
grounds for municipal solid waste imported from other states. These 
states feel that it is unfair for their citizens to bear the burden of 
managing out-of-state solid waste because other jurisdictions have 
been unwilling or unable to site new disposal facilities. 15 Other states 
and communities welcome imported solid waste, however, because it 
provides jobs, tax revenues, and other benefits.16 
Some states have erected barriers to the importation of out-of-state 
waste, including "outright bans, differential fees, moratoria on facility 
construction, various planning and capacity assurance requirements 
or other mechanisms."17 By 1992, thirty-seven states had enacted such 
laws, precipitating a "waste war."18 These states "assert that they 
need import restrictions to protect the health and safety of their 
citizens, to conserve natural resources, to facilitate the management 
of their own waste, and to reduce the risks associated with waste 
disposal facilities."19 Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.) has stated that 
Canadian province of Ontario export more than one million tons of [municipal solid 
waste] for disposal; and an additional 13 States and the District of Columbia exported 
at least 100,000 tons of waste in 1992. 
S. REP. No. 52, supra note 7, at 2. 
12 See CURBING WASTE, supra note 6, at 39. 
I:J The NGA noted that states that import municipal solid waste are watching their disposal 
capacity disappear, thus raising "questions about the ability of receiving states to meet the 
disposal needs of their own citizens." Id. The national decline in landfill availability magnifies 
the problem. See id. 
14 The location of landfills frequently generates political opposition. This phenomenon is known 
as the "Not in My Backyard Syndrome" (NIMBY). Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National 
Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198, 198 (1990); see Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. 
Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Ap-
proach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 267-69 (1982). 
15 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 14, at 268. 
16 H.R. REP. No. 720, supra note 8, at 9. 
17 S. REP. No. 52, supra note 7, at 3; see Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Waste War: Fort Gratiot 
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Chemical Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78, 79 (1994). 
IS S. REP. No. 301, supra note 2, at 74; Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 79. 
19 Fitzgerald, supra note 17, at 79. 
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the waste war "is being fought because communities are being forced 
to take more out-of-state trash than at any time in our history."2o 
The Supreme Court has not been sympathetic to the import states' 
concerns. Beginning in 1978, in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
the Court has invalidated state waste-import restrictions on the 
grounds that they impermissibly discriminate against interstate com-
merce.21 In 1992, the Supreme Court in Chemical Waste Management, 
Inc. v. Hunt, determined that an Alabama law establishing an addi-
tional fee of $72 per ton for the disposal of out-of-state hazardous 
waste violated the Commerce Clause.22 In the same year, the Supreme 
Court held in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan De-
partment of Natural Resources, that a Michigan law, which allowed 
counties to exclude out-of-county solid waste, also violated the Com-
merce Clause.23 These cases demonstrate the Court's belief that the 
Commerce Clause guarantees a national economic marketplace 
in which waste, like any other good, can pass freely across state 
borders.24 
The Supreme Court, however, fails to recognize that "a clean and 
healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of solid 
waste, is the commodity really at issue in cases such as this."25 The 
Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause undermines the 
scheme of federalism embodied in the Constitution and exacerbates 
the shortage of available landfills by discouraging state and local 
governments from siting such facilities. 
This Article analyzes the latest battle in the waste war, Oregon 
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality.26 In 
that case, the Supreme Court invalidated Oregon laws that imposed 
a $2.25 per ton surcharge on the disposal of out-of-state solid waste, 
while charging an $.85 per ton fee for the disposal of in-state solid 
waste.27 This Article argues that the Supreme Court should have 
20 Senators See 'Civil War' Over Waste Imports; Coats Says He Will Offer Import Bank Bill 
Again, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA), at 483 (June 21, 1991). 
21 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). 
22 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339 (1992); see infra notes 33-35 
and accompanying text. 
2:< Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 
358 (1992). 
24 Id.; Chemical Waste, 504 U.S. at 338-42; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-29. 
25 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
26 I d. at 1345. 
27 I d. at 1348, 1355. 
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upheld the Oregon laws, employing the less rigorous test pronounced 
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (the Pike balancing test),28 instead of 
the strict scrutiny test.29 The Oregon laws were evenhanded statutes 
that did not discriminate against interstate commerce, but simply 
established a compensatory tax that was designed to recoup the costs 
paid by Oregon residents through the state income tax for solid waste 
disposal. The laws served legitimate state interests-providing for 
the safe disposal of municipal solid waste, advancing the health and 
safety of Oregon citizens, and protecting the environment. Ultimately, 
the benefits of the Oregon laws, providing for the equitable treatment 
of in-state and out-of-state residents regarding the costs for the safe 
disposal of solid wastes, outweighed the burden on interstate com-
merce, amounting to approximately $.14 per week for the average 
out-of-state generator of solid waste.30 
The first section of this Article discusses the dormant Commerce 
Clause and the tests the Supreme Court has developed to evaluate 
interstate commerce. Section II provides background facts of Ore-
gon's legislative efforts to control its waste problem and outlines 
caselaw leading up to the decision in Oregon Waste Systems.31 Section 
III critically analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Oregon Waste 
Systems and suggests that the Court used the wrong test to strike 
down the law.32 Finally, Section IV reviews recent efforts by Congress 
to resolve the waste war. 
28 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Court stated that: 
[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes 
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend 
on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
29 See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977). 
30 Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court 
stated: 
[t]he $2.25 per ton fee imposed on out-of-state waste exceeds the $.85 per ton fee 
imposed on in-state waste by $1.40. One ton equals 2,000 pounds. Assuming that the 
hypothetical nonresident generates 200 pounds of garbage per month (1/10 of a ton), 
the nonresident's garbage bill would increase by $.14 per month. 
[d. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
31 [d. at 1348-49. 
32 [d. at 1350-51. 
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I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Con-
gress the authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States."33 The Commerce Clause not only grants 
Congress the power to act, but also affects situations in which Con-
gress has chosen not to act.34 The Supreme Court has recognized that 
there is a dormant or negative Commerce Clause authority which lim-
its the power of the states to erect barriers against interstate trade.35 
There are four general views regarding the purposes of the Court's 
dormant Commerce Clause authority.36 The first view posits that the 
Court, in order to promote free trade, may overturn state legislation 
which impedes economic efficiency.37 The second view, focusing on 
inefficiency in the political process, holds that the Court reviews state 
law to ensure that interests unrepresented in the state legislative 
process are not discriminated against.38 The third view, which com-
bines elements of the two aforementioned positions, holds that the 
Court should review state legislation to ensure that the state law does 
not threaten the national political process and invite resentment and 
retaliation.39 The fourth and most provocative view holds that the 
Court lacks any dormant Commerce Clause authority.40 
33 u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause gives 
Congress plenary authority which is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, 
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
:14 JOHN E. NOWAK, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS § 8.1, at 260-61 (3d ed. 1986); see also 
Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 260 (1872); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 
53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 305 (1851); Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244, 
248 (1829). 
35 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 554 (1992); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 
(1979); Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,370--72 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons v. 
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949). 
:<6 David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, 
Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1313, 
1314,1315-17 n.29 (1989). 
:17 Id. at 1314; H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 537-39. But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust 
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 45-46 (1983). 
38 Pomper, supra note 36, at 1314; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 205-06 (1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
83-84 (1980); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 
439 (1982); Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 1203, 1209--10 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 
WIS. L. REV. 125, 132 (1979). 
89 Pomper, supra note 36, at 1316--17; see also Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and 
Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 567-70 (1983). 
40 Pomper, supra note 36, at 1314 n.29; Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant 
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In analyzing whether state legislation violates dormant Commerce 
Clause authority, the Supreme Court has adopted "a two-tiered ap-
proach."41 The Court distinguishes between state statutes that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce on their face or in their effect, 
and state statutes that regulate evenhandedly with only indirect ef-
fects on interstate commerce.42 If the Court finds that a state statute 
regulates in an evenhanded manner to realize a legitimate local pur-
pose, the Court will employ the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc. 43 Under the Pike balancing test, the Court will uphold 
the statute "unless the burden imposed on such [interstate] commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."44 
If the Court finds that a state statute discriminates either explicitly 
or effectively against interstate commerce, the statute is assumed to 
be invalid and is subject to the strict scrutiny test of Hunt v. Wash-
ington Apple Advertising Commission.45 The state must demonstrate 
"the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives [are] adequate to preserve the local 
interests at stake."46 If a state statute is a form of economic protec-
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617 n.28 
(1987); see also Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71, 91-97 (1980) (advocating this approach 
in the natural resource context). 
Justice Scalia has stated that the Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions "made no 
sense." Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that the "uncertainty in application has been attributable in 
no small part to the lack of any clear theoretical underpinnings for judicial 'enforcement' of the 
Commerce Clause." [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
41 Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578 (1986). 
42 [d. at 579. The Court stated that it had: 
adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach. . .. When a state statute directly 
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor 
in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down 
the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects 
on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the 
State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly 
exceeds the local benefits. We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating 
the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce 
Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach. In 
either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both 
local and interstate activity. 
[d. at 578-79 (citations omitted). 
43 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578. 
44 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
45 See 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
46 [d. 
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tionism, the Court has erected a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" 
under City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.47 
The invocation and application of these tests proved crucial to the 
United States Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
in the Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental 
Quality decision.48 Finding discrimination against interstate com-
merce, the United States Supreme Court strictly scrutinized and 
invalidated the Oregon laws.49 The Supreme Court invoked the wrong 
test, however, failing to recognize that the Oregon laws were even-
handed statutes that furthered a legitimate state purpose. The Su-
preme Court should have utilized the Pike balancing test and found 
that the benefits of the Oregon laws exceeded any burdens imposed 
on interstate commerce. 50 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1989, Oregon enacted comprehensive waste-reduction legisla-
tion.51 The Oregon legislature declared that "[t]here is a shortage of 
appropriate sites for landfills in Oregon" and that "[i]t is in the best 
interests of the people of Oregon to extend the useful life of existing 
solid waste disposal sites by . . . requiring solid waste to undergo 
volume reduction through recycling and reuse measures before dis-
posal in landfills."52 
The legislation directed the Oregon Environmental Quality Com-
mission (EQC) to establish by rule a surcharge based on the costs to 
the state and its political subdivisions of disposing of out-of-state solid 
waste.53 In December 1990, the EQC established a surcharge of $2.25 
47 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1977). 
48 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 
1354 (1994). 
49 See id. at 1355 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
50 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
5! OR. REV. STAT. § 459.297 (1992) provides: 
1) Beginning on January 1, 1991, every person who disposes of solid waste generated 
out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site shall pay a surcharge as estab-
lished by the Environmental Quality Commission under DRS 459.298. The surcharge 
shall be in addition to any other fee charged for disposal of solid waste at the site. 
2) The surcharge collected under this section shall be deposited in the State Treasury 
to the credit of an account of the Department of Environmental Quality. Such moneys 
are continuously appropriated to the department to meet the costs of the department 
in administering the solid waste program .... 
52 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.015(1)(c)-(d) (1992), amended by 1991 Or. Laws, ch. 385, § 7; see 
Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 837 P.2d 965, 973 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
53 OR. REV. STAT. § 459.298 (1992) provides: 
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per ton on foreign waste. The EQC was also directed to establish a 
fee for the disposal of in-state waste which was not cost driven, but 
was a revenue device for the support of environmental protection 
programs, solid waste planning, and recycling. The fee on in-state 
waste was statutorily limited to $.50 per ton, but the statute was 
amended in 1991 to raise the in-state fee to $.85 per ton.54 
Oregon Waste Systems (OWS) owned and operated a regional solid 
waste disposal facility, the Columbia Ridge Recycling Center and 
Landfill located southwest of Arlington in Gilliam County. OWS dis-
posed of solid waste generated both inside and outside of Oregon. The 
business provided direct and indirect benefits to Gilliam County by 
employing its citizens and paying local fees and taxes. The Columbia 
Resource Company (CRC) had a twenty-year contract with Clark 
County, Washington, under which it disposed of the county's solid 
waste. The CRC utilized the Finley Buttes Landfill in Morrow 
County, Oregon as its disposal site.55 OWS, CRC, and Gilliam County 
brought suit challenging the Oregon laws, alleging, inter alia, that the 
different fees violated the Commerce Clause. 56 
The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the statutes, recognizing that 
Oregon was charging "a compensatory fee" for special costs incurred 
by the state and its political subdivisions regarding solid waste dis-
posal. 57 The extra costs borne by Oregon included costs associated 
with solid waste management, permit issuance, environmental moni-
toring, groundwater monitoring, and site closure.58 The court noted 
that the law was simply designed to make "out-of-state generators 
[s]ubject to approval by the Joint Committee on Ways and Means during the legislative 
sessions or the Emergency Board during the interim between sessions, the [EQC] shall 
establish by rule the amount of the surcharge to be collected under DRS § 459.297. The 
amount of the surcharge shall be based on the costs to the state of Oregon and political 
subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state which are not otherwise 
paid for under the provisions of DRS .... These costs may include but need not be 
limited to costs incurred for: (1) Solid waste management; (2) Issuing new and renewal 
permits for solid waste disposal sites; (3) Environmental monitoring; (4) Ground water 
monitoring; and (5) Site closure and post-closure activities. 
54 [d. § 459.294(5) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 459A.ll0(5) (1992». 
55 Gilliam County, 837 P.2d at 968. 
56 [d. The plaintiffs in Gilliam County raised several procedural arguments. They asserted 
that OR. REV. STAT. § 459.298 required the agency to follow an unconstitutional process. [d. at 
970. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that if the procedures were permissible, then the rules 
promulgated under them were invalid because the agency did not follow the procedures. If the 
rules were made through a valid procedure, they were still invalid because they discriminated 
against interstate commerce. [d. 
57 [d. at 975. 
58 [d. 
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pay their fair share of the costs and no more."59 Furthermore, the 
court held that facial review of the legislation and regulations did not 
show that the fees were either excessive or unrelated to the state-
provided services.60 
The Oregon Supreme Court also found that the different fees did 
not violate the Commerce Clause.61 The court held that the Commerce 
Clause prohibits discrimination against out-of-state goods unless 
there are reasons for the discrimination other than their origin.62 In 
this case, the surcharge on out-of-state solid waste acted as a compen-
satory fee for the services rendered by the state and local govern-
ments.63 In finding the laws valid, however, the court asserted that 
state judicial review laws prevented the court from determining if the 
fees were excessive in the context of that suit.64 
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision contradicted two previous 
federal court holdings that invalidated Indiana65 and Georgia66 stat-
utes imposing higher costs for the disposal of out-of-state waste. In 
1991, Indiana enacted statutes discouraging solid waste imports by 
imposing backhaullimitations, registration and sticker requirements, 
surety bond posting, and higher tipping fees for the disposal of out-
of-state waste.67 Indiana asserted that the higher tipping fees "merely 
offset[] what would otherwise be a subsidy for interstate commerce" 
591d. at 977 (citing Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346 n.9 (1992». 
60 Gilliam County, 837 P.2d at 977. 
61 Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 508 (Or. 1993). 
621d. at 507. 
63 I d. at 508. 
64 ld. at 508-09; OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400 (1991) provides in part: 
1) The validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the 
Court of Appeals in the manner provided for review of orders in contested cases. The 
court shall have jurisdiction to review the validity of the rule whether or not the 
petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in 
question, but not when the petitioner is a party to an order or a contested case in which 
the validity of the rule may be determined by a court .... 
3) Judicial review of a rule shall be limited to an examination of: a) The rule under 
review; b) The statutory provisions authorizing the rule; and c) Copies of all documents 
necessary to demonstrate compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures. 
4) The court shall declare the rule invalid only if it finds that the rule; a) Violates 
constitutional provisions; b) Exceeds the statutory authority of the agency; or c) Was 
adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures. 
65 Government Suppliers Consolidating Servo V. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1992). 
66 Southern States Landfill, Inc. V. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725, 736 
(M.D. Ga. 1992). 
67 See Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1270-72. 
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and "require[] out-of-state haulers to shoulder their fair share of 
in-state administrative costS."68 Once the costs generated by the dis-
posal of out-of-state waste were determined, "the state was constitu-
tionally permitted to level the playing field."69 
In Government Suppliers Consolidating Service v. Bayh, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 
utilizing the Pike balancing test, upheld the Indiana statutes for the 
most part, striking down only the surety bond requirement.7o On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
found the laws discriminatory and subjected them to strict judicial 
scrutiny. The Seventh Circuit determined that the higher tipping fees 
for out-of-state waste allowed the "state to tax interstate commerce 
more heavily than in-state commerce any time the entities involved in 
interstate commerce happened to use facilities supported by general 
tax funds."71 This ran contrary to the caselaw which requires equality 
in the treatment of in-state and out-of-state concerns. There was no 
equality because the "Indiana statutes imposed a tax on haulers of 
waste which cross state lines, while sparing haulers of waste who re-
main entirely within the state."72 Even more, the Indiana statutes 
provided for additional fees to offset the costs incurred by "a county, 
municipality or township that can be attributed to the importation of 
the solid waste into Indiana."73 In striking down the laws, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that "a state may not avoid the strictures of the Com-
merce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce 
through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself."74 
Likewise, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Georgia struck down state disposal laws as violative of the Com-
merce Clause.75 In 1990, Georgia enacted the Georgia Comprehensive 
68 [d. at 1283. 
69 [d. 
70 See Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 866-67 (S.D. Ind. 
1990). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
district court determined that the surety bond provision was "an unnecessary burden on 
interstate commerce." Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1274. 
71 Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1284. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. (citing IND. CODE § 13-9.5-5-1(b) (1991)). 
74 Bayh, 975 F.2d at 1284-85. 
75 Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725, 736 
(M.D. Ga. 1992). 
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Solid Waste Management Act (GCSWMA),76 which placed restrictions 
on the disposal of out-of-state solid waste that were not imposed on 
in-state waste. First, out-of-state waste handlers were required to 
"develop and implement a waste analysis plan capable of identifying 
representative samples of all waste received by the facility."77 Second, 
all out-of-state waste transported within Georgia had to be accompa-
nied by a manifest.78 Third, out-of-state waste handlers were required 
to pay a fee of $10 for every ton of out-of-state waste that they 
received for disposal.79 Fourth, all generators, collectors, processors, 
transporters, and disposers of out-of-state waste were subject to 
random inspections.so Finally, handling permits for out-of-state waste 
were only effective for ten years.81 In 1992, two privately owned 
landfills seeking to dispose of out-of-state waste challenged the laws 
as undue burdens on interstate commerce, because the landfills were 
forced to comply with a set of administrative requirements that were 
not required for the handling of in-state waste.82 Following the 
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt83 and Fort Gratiot Sani-
tary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources84 
framework, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Georgia found the GCSWMA facially discriminatory against out-of-
state waste and employed strict scrutiny to invalidate the laws.85 
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Oregon Waste Systems, 
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Equality, running counter to 
the federal court cases in Georgia and Indiana, set the stage for 
United States Supreme Court review of the Oregon case.86 In Oregon 
Waste Systems, the United States Supreme Court overturned the 
Oregon Supreme Court and invalidated the Oregon laws on Com-
merce Clause grounds.87 Finding the different fees for in-state and 
76 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-20, et. seq. (1992). 
77Id. § 12-8-27(a)(3). 
78Id. § 12-8-27(b). 
79Id. § 12-8-27(c). 
80 Id. § 12-8-27(d). 
81 Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725, 
729-30 (M.D. Ga. 1992). 
S2 See id. at 727-28. 
83 504 U.S. 334, 338-42 (1992). 
1<4504 U.S. 353, 359-61 (1992). 
85 See Southern States, 801 F. Supp. at 730-32. 
il6 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 
1355 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
87Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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out-of-state waste facially discriminatory, the United States Supreme 
Court subjected the Oregon laws to strict scrutiny.88 The Court re-
jected the Oregon court's findings that the surcharge on out-of-state 
waste was a nondiscriminatory, compensatory tax designed to make 
up for the costs paid by Oregon residents through their state income 
tax. The Court found that there was no in-state charge comparable to 
the out-of-state surcharge. Even if the state income tax was the 
in-state analogue, the surcharge still did not meet the requirements 
of a compensatory tax because it was not being levied on a substan-
tially equivalent event.89 The Court also rejected Oregon's arguments 
that the surcharge allowed Oregon to spread the costs of solid waste 
disposal to all Oregon citizens and helped reserve Oregon landfills for 
in-state residents by discouraging solid waste import.90 The Court 
noted that, although these were legitimate state purposes, they could 
be met by nondiscriminatory means.91 
III. ANALYSIS 
The United States Supreme Court, in Oregon Waste Systems, 
wrongly invoked the analytical framework of Chemical Waste Man-
agement, Inc. v. Hunt92 to review the Oregon solid waste disposal 
laws.93 In Chemical Waste Management, the Court examined a 1990 
Alabama law that charged two fees for the disposal of hazardous 
waste in Alabama. A base fee of $25.60 per ton was imposed on all 
hazardous waste disposed of in Alabama, regardless of origin.94 An 
additional fee of $72 per ton was levied on all hazardous waste gener-
ated outside of Alabama and disposed of in Alabama.95 The law also 
capped the amount of hazardous waste that could be deposited at a 
commercial facility in a one-year period.96 
The United States Supreme Court held that since the Alabama law 
facially discriminated against interstate commerce, regardless of the 
purported local purposes and the absence of nondiscriminatory alter-
88 Id. at 1350--51. 
89 Id. at 1352. 
90 Id. at 1353-54. 
91 See Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1354-55. 
92 504 U.S. 334, 338-42 (1992). 
93 Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1350-51. 
94 Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 338 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(a) (1975 & 
Supp. 1994». 
95Id. at 338-39 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b». 
96 Id. at 338 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2.3). 
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natives, the law would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Ala-
bama could not isolate itself from a national problem by erecting a 
barrier to interstate commerce.97 
The Court determined that Alabama's concerns for the health and 
safety of Alabama citizens, the protection of the environment, and the 
conservation of natural resources did not vary with the origin of the 
waste.98 The Court characterized the additional fee on out-of-state 
hazardous waste as a form of economic protectionism which saddled 
out-of-state generators with the burden of reducing the flow of haz-
ardous waste into Alabama.99 Since Alabama allowed the generation 
and disposal of hazardous waste within state borders and the impor-
tation of hazardous waste if the fee was paid, the Alabama law was 
not analogous to a quarantine law that would prevent the traffic of 
noxious articles whatever their point of origin. 100 The Court also found 
that nondiscriminatory alternatives were available, such as "a gener-
ally applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed 
of within Alabama, or a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting 
hazardous waste across Alabama roads, or an even-handed cap on the 
total tonnage landfilled at [the disposal facility]."101 The Court spe-
cifically did not address the issues "that the additional fee makes 
out-of-state generators pay their 'fair share' of the costs of Alabama 
waste disposal facilities, however, or that the additional fee is justified 
as a 'compensatory tax."'102 
The United States Supreme Court should not have utilized the 
Chemical Waste Management framework to review the Oregon laws 
in Oregon Waste Systems. Rather, the Court should have employed 
the Pike balancing test because the Oregon laws were evenhanded 
regulations that served a legitimate state goal of having in-state and 
out-of-state residents pay the same aggregate amounts for the safe 
disposal of solid waste. Other federal circuit courts, specifically the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Evergreen 
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service District103 and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Diamond Waste, 
97 [d. at 338-42. 
98 [d. at 342-47. 
99 Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 342-47. 
100 [d. at 346-47. 
101 [d. at 344 (emphasis in original deleted) (citations omitted). 
102 [d. at 346 n.9. The Court stated that, "[ w le pretermit this issue, for it was not the basis for 
the decision below and has not been briefed or argued by the parties here." [d. 
103 820 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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Inc. v. Monroe County, Georgia,I°4 utilized the Pike balancing test 
to evaluate local bans on solid waste imports.105 Furthermore, the 
benefits of the Oregon laws clearly outweighed any burdens on inter-
state commerce. The Oregon laws provided for the safe disposal 
of solid waste and only cost the typical out-of-state generator $.14 
per week. 
A. Evenhandedness 
Before employing the Pike balancing test, courts must determine 
whether a state law regulates in an evenhanded manner. The Oregon 
laws satisfied this criterion as nondiscriminatory, compensatory taxes. 
The Supreme Court has upheld compensatory taxes levied on out-of-
state concerns to compensate for charges imposed on in-state busi-
nesses.106 Indeed, compensatory taxes are designed to provide equal-
ity of treatment between in-state and out-of-state businesses.107 In 
early cases,108 the Court examined the purposes and effects of com-
pensatory taxes to ensure that the taxes were nondiscriminatory.109 
The Court compared burdens placed on out-of-state concerns to those 
104 939 F.2d 941, 944--45 (11th Cir. 1991). 
105 See Omni Group Farms, Inc. v. County of Cayuga, 766 F. Supp. 69, 75-76 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). 
For a contrary view, see BFI Medical Waste Sys. v. Whatcom County, 983 F.2d 911, 913 (9th 
Cir. 1992); BFI Medical Waste Sys., Inc. v. Whatcom County, 756 F. Supp. 480, 483-86 (W.D. 
Wash. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1992); and Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 
Md., 556 F. Supp. 182, 184-87 (D. Md. 1983). 
106 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 1352 
(1994). 
107 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758-59 (1981); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax 
Comm'r, 429 U.S. 318, 331-32 (1977); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-84 (1937); 
see generally Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State 
Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986). 
108 Commentators have noted that "[s]ome of the older Supreme Court decisions appear to go 
further afield in search of compensating taxes than more recent decisions. Older decisions 
considered different types of taxes on unrelated activities to be complementary." Philip M. 
Tatarowicz and Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination 
Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 909 (1986). 
109 The United States Supreme Court noted that, in reviewing Commerce Clause challenges 
to state taxes, its goal has been to "establish a consistent and rational method of inquiry" 
focusing on "the practical effect of a challenged tax." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 
445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980). 
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that: 
the focus is always upon the effect or economic consequences of the state tax upon 
interstate commerce .... The delicate balance between the conflicting state's interests 
... and those of interstate commerce ... requires careful analysis of 'the unique 
characteristics of the statute at issue and the particular circumstances in each case.' 
... Moreover, in challenging the constitutionality of a state's taxing legislation under 
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imposed on in-state businesses through the state tax scheme to en-
sure that in-state businesses were not granted any advantage over 
out-of-state concerns.110 
In 1868, in Hinson v. Lott, the Supreme Court reviewed an Alabama 
law that imposed a gallon tax on the sale of liquor produced out-of-
state and imported into Alabama, but placed no similar fee on liquor 
produced in-state. 111 The Court found the tax nondiscriminatory be-
cause local distillers were subject to a comparable tax. ll2 The Court 
did not dwell on the point that the taxes fell on different businesses-
retailers for out-of-state liquor and distillers for in-state liquor. In-
deed, the Court found that the gallon tax was a "complementary 
provision necessary to make the tax equal on all liquors sold in the 
State."1l3 The tax did not discriminate against out-of-state products, 
but "merely subject[ed] them to the same rate of taxation" as articles 
manufactured in-state.1l4 The tax was therefore not "an attempt to 
regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate exercise of the 
taxing power of the State[]."1l5 
Likewise, in 1926, in General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, the 
Supreme Court examined a Louisiana tax imposed on nonresident 
corporations' rolling stock operated in the state.llB The tax was de-
the Commerce Clause, the burden is on the challenger to overcome the presumption 
of validity given to all such legislation. 
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 509 A.2d 838, 848-49 (Pa. 1986), rev'd, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) 
(citations omitted). 
One commentator noted that, "a bright line test is not easily discernible from the number of 
decisions where the Court inquired whether the alleged compensating tax did properly serve 
as a balm of Gilead to heal an otherwise discriminatorily ill tax." PHILIP HARTMAN, FEDERAL 
LIMITS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, § 2:19, at 23 (Supp. 1985); see also Tatarowicz and 
Mims-Velarde, supra note 108, at 909-17. 
110 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 480 (1932). The Court noted that: "[t]here is no 
demand in [the] Constitution that the State shall put its requirements in anyone statute. It 
may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality, is within the State's 
constitutional power." Id. 
The Court stated that: 
[a] state tax must be assessed in light of its actual effect considered in conjunction with 
other provisions of the State's tax scheme. In each case it is our duty to determine 
whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical 
operation work discrimination against interstate commerce. 
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 756 (citation omitted). 
111 Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 148-49 (1868). 
112 Id. at 152-53. 
113Id. at 153. 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116 General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367, 370 (1926). 
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signed to compensate for local property taxes paid by residents.ll7 The 
Court found that the tax "discloses no purpose to discriminate against 
nonresident taxpayers."118 The tax was "not invalid merely because 
the equality in its operation as compared with local taxation has not 
been attained with mathematical exactness."119 The Court focused on 
"the fairness and reasonableness of its purposes and practical opera-
tion, rather than [on] minute differences between its application in 
practice and the application of the taxing statute or statutes to which 
it is complementary."12o The Court upheld the tax because the amount 
paid by out-of-state businesses was approximately the same as that 
paid by in-state businesses.121 
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in two other cases 
involving state laws taxing out-of-state concerns, upholding the laws 
because their effect was not unfair. In Interstate Busses Corp. v. 
Blodgett, the Court upheld Connecticut's $.01 per mile highway tax 
imposed on interstate carriers, although no similar tax was imposed 
on intrastate carriers.l22 Local carriers, however, were subject to a 3% 
gross receipt tax and income taxes for which interstate carriers were 
not responsible. l23 Even though in-state and out-of-state carriers were 
treated differently, the Supreme Court found no discrimination be-
cause the mileage fee on out-of-state residents did not exceed the 
in-state gross receipt tax and income tax.l24 The Court noted that, 
"[t]o gain the relief for which it prays, appellant is under the necessity 
of showing that in actual practice the tax of which it complains falls 
with disproportionate economic weight on it."125 
Similarly, in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld a South Carolina tax on gas imported into the state and 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 373. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 General Am. Tank Car, 270 U.S. at 374--75. 
122 Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 250 (1928). 
12:lId. 
124 Id. at 250-51. The Court stated that: 
[a]ppellant plainly does not establish discrimination by showing merely that the two 
statutes are different in fonn or adopt a different measure or method of assessment, 
or that it is subject to three kinds of taxes while interstate carriers are subject only 
to two or to one. We cannot say from a mere inspection ofthe statutes that the mileage 
tax is a substantially greater burden on appellant's interstate business than is its 
correlative, the gross receipts tax, on comparable interstate businesses. 
Id. at 251. 
125 Id. 
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stored for future use.126 The Court found the tax compensated for an 
excise tax on the sale and use of gas produced within the state.127 The 
Court stated the rule that, "[ w]e regard the substance rather than 
the form, and the controlling test is found in the operation and effect 
of the statute as applied and enforced by the State."128 
The Supreme Court applied the same framework based on dispro-
portionate effects in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., where it upheld 
a Washington use tax on personal property that had not been subject 
to the Washington sales tax or any other state's sales or use tax of 
equal or greater amount. l29 The purpose of the tax was "that retail 
sellers in Washington will be helped to compete upon terms of equal-
ity with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax 
or any corresponding burden."13o The use tax was comparable to 
the sales tax on the purchase of similar goods in Washington.13l In 
validating the tax scheme, the Court remarked that, "[ w ]hen the 
account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater 
burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the 
gates."132 
In 1961, in Alaska v. Arctic Maid, the Supreme Court reviewed an 
Alaska tax imposed on freezer ships.133 The tax was 4% of the value 
of salmon caught or obtained for freezing in Alaska's territorial sea 
and sold out of state, primarily to canneries in Washington.134 Alaska 
imposed no similar fee on salmon caught, frozen, and sent to Alaskan 
canneries, but Alaskan canneries paid a tax of 6% on the value of 
salmon for canning.135 Comparing the tax on the freezer ships with the 
tax on the Alaskan canneries, the Court found no discrimination be-
cause "no matter how the tax on 'freezer ships' is computed, it did not 
exceed the six-percent tax on the local canners."136 Even if there was 
a difference between the taxes, it was "not so 'palpably disproportion-
126 Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 482 (1932). 
127 [d. at 481. The Court stated that: "[djiscrimination, like interstate commerce itself, is a 
practical conception. We must deal in this matter, as in others, with substantial distinctions and 
real injuries." [d. 
128 [d. at 476. 
129 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 588 (1937). 
130 [d. at 581. 
131 See id. at 584. 
132 [d. 
133 Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199,204 (1961). 
184 [d. 
135 [d. at 204. 
136 [d. 
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ate' ... as to run afoul of the Commerce Clause."137 The Court pointed 
out that "[n]o 'iron rule of equality' between taxes laid by a State on 
different types of business is necessary."I38 
In 1981, the Supreme Court began to revise the compensatory tax 
doctrine in Maryland v. Louisiana, imposing a stricter test based on 
the specific interests taxed.139 Louisiana enacted a first-use tax on 
natural gas imported into the state and not previously subjected to 
state severance or production taxes.140 The first-use tax was designed 
to equalize the price of imported natural gas, which came from the 
federal outer continental shelf (OCS), with the price of natural gas 
produced in Louisiana, which was subject to a state severance tax.141 
The Court determined that even though Louisiana was seeking equal-
ity, the various exemptions and credits provided under the first-use 
tax precluded the burden of the tax from falling on in-state users.l42 
The Court rejected Louisiana's assertion that the first-use tax was a 
valid compensatory tax.l43 Attempting to identify the in-state burden 
that the tax was designed to compensate, Louisiana claimed that the 
first-use tax equalled the state severance tax.l44 The Court found that 
Louisiana had no interest in OCS natural gas, however.145 Thus, unlike 
the valid use and sales taxes in Henneford v. Silas Mason CO.,t46 the 
two Louisiana taxes were not comparable, because they were not 
levied on a "substantially equivalent event."147 
The Supreme Court's new "substantially equivalent event" require-
ment for compensatory taxes departed from the disproportionate 
effects test used in prior cases.l48 In fact, the new standard would 
likely have invalidated statutes that previously had been accept-
able.149 Compensatory taxes were designed to equalize in-state and 
137 [d. at 205. 
138 Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. at 205. 
139 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 725-26 (1981). 
140 [d. at 731. 
141 See id. 
142 [d. at 753...{i0. 
148 [d. at 758. 
144 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 758-59. 
145 [d. at 759. 
146 300 U.S. 577, 588 (1937). 
147 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 759. 
148 Several commentators noted that, "[u]nfortunately, the 'substantially equivalent events' 
test sheds very little light on the problem of identifying compensatory taxes." Tatarowicz and 
Mims-Velarde, supra note 108, at 911. 
149 See Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199,204-05 (1981) (taxes on freezer ships headed out 
of state to compensate in-state taxes on canneries); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 
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out-of-state burdens, and Louisiana's first-use tax accomplished this 
end.150 Nevertheless, the Court was correct to invalidate Louisiana's 
first-use tax because the credits and exemptions precluded equality 
of treatment and favored in-state interests. The Court could have 
arrived at the same conclusion, however, by employing the previously 
used purposes and effects approach.151 
In 1984, in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, the Supreme Court reviewed 
a West Virginia statute that levied a gross receipt tax of .27% on 
property manufactured out-of-state and imported for sale.152 Local 
manufacturers, whether based in-state or out-of-state, were exempt 
from the wholesale tax because they paid a manufacturing tax of 
.88%.153 The Court determined that the taxing scheme discriminated 
against interstate commerce, even though in-state manufacturers 
paid more taxes than out-of-state wholesalers.l54 The wholesale tax 
could not be considered a compensatory tax because manufacturing 
and wholesaling were not substantially equivalent events.155 
The Armco Court imposed a further requirement that the state's 
taxes must be internally consistent.156 If such taxes were enacted in 
U.S. 245, 251-52 (1928) (highway tax on interstate carriers to compensate for in-state gross 
receipt and income tax). 
150 One commentator stated that: 
one can argue that the First Use Tax is not discriminatory within the meaning of the 
Commerce Clause .... [W]hen the tax is viewed in light of the severance tax imposed 
on gas extracted within Louisiana, one can contend that the practical effect of the levy 
is to create equality between the tax burdens borne by gas flowing into Louisiana, 
whether extracted in Louisiana or offshore. Establishing such equality, after all, was 
the principal goal of the framers of the First Use Tax .... 
Walter Hellerstein, State Thxation in the Federal System: Perspectives on Louisiana's First 
Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55 TuL. L. REV. 601, 622 (1981). 
151 See David F. Shores, State Thxation of Gross Receipts and the Negative Commerce Clause, 
54 Mo. L. REV. 555, 572-73 (1989); see also Robert G. Lathrop, Armco---A Narrow and Puzzling 
Test for Discriminatory State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 TAXES 551, 557 (1985); see 
also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
152 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984). 
153 [d. 
154 [d. at 644. 
155 [d. at 643. Several commentators noted that: 
the Court's enunciation of a test based solely on comparison of events is misleading. 
The Court in these two cases [Armco and Maryland v. Louisiana] appears to have 
focused not only on the equivalence of events, but also on other factors relating to the 
operation and interaction of the two taxes. Thus, it is unclear just how the Court now 
decides whether two taxes are complementary. 
Tatarowicz and Mims-Velarde, supra note 108, at 911. Another commentator stated that, 
"[a]lthough manufacturing and wholesaling are different events, this observation sheds no light 
on the practical economic effect of the taxes." Shores, supra note 151, at 571. 
156 Armco, 467 U.S. at 644. 
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every jurisdiction, there would be no interference with interstate 
commerce.157 The Court pointed out that if another state imposed a 
manufacturing tax, the out-of-state business would pay both the home 
state's manufacturing tax and the West Virginia wholesale tax, while 
businesses in West Virginia would pay only the manufacturing tax.l58 
The Court did not require proof on this point, noting that: 
[a]ny other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West 
Virginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of 
the tax codes of [forty-nine] other states, and that the validity of 
the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particu-
lar other States in which it operated.159 
The Armco Court should have utilized the purposes and effects 
tesp60 and upheld the West Virginia tax.161 The purpose of the West 
Virginia tax was to avoid subjecting in-state manufacturers to double 
taxation. The effect of the West Virginia tax should have been "meas-
ured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions."162 In-state manufac-
turers paid a tax of .88%, while out-of-state wholesalers paid a tax of 
only .27%.163 Although in-state manufacturers paid a tax three times 
higher than out-of-state wholesalers, the tax was nondiscriminatory.l64 
The Court should have relied on Alaska v. Arctic Maid, which avoided 
rigid rules of equality regarding taxes on different types of busi-
nesses, and upheld the West Virginia tax because there was no favor-
157Id. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court noted that the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause require fairness on the part of the states when 
determining the tax base of interstate companies subject to state taxation. See Container Corp. 
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). The Court declared that, "[t]he first, and 
... obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal 
consistency-that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would 
result in no more than all of the unitary business'[s] income being taxed." Id.; see also Walter 
Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce 
Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 139-40 (1988); Milton G. Rowland, 
In Support of Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty and Internal Consistency: A Pleafor Bright-Line Rules 
in the Area of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 365, 372 (1986/87). 
158 Armco, 467 U.S. at 644. 
159Id. at 644-45. 
160 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
161 The West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that it did not violate the 
Commerce Clause. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 303 S.E.2d 706 (W. Va. 1983); see also C. James 
Judson & Susan G. Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat From 
Economic Reality In Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 723, 723 (1985). 
162 Armco, 467 U.S. at 647 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 
373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963». 
163 Shores, supra note 151, at 570. 
164 Id. at 571. 
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itism of in-state manufacturers.165 Furthermore, the Court should not 
have invoked internal consistency, a factor applicable to net income 
determinations, but not relevant to Commerce Clause violations.166 In 
dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that, "[w]here a State's taxes are 
linked exactly to the activities taxed, it should be unnecessary to 
examine a hypothetical taxing scheme to see if interstate commerce 
would be unduly burdened."167 
The next step in the evolution of the compensatory tax doctrine 
occurred in 1987, in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State 
Department of Revenue, which involved a Washington business and 
occupation tax imposed on wholesaling and manufacturing.16s The 
wholesale tax was measured by the gross receipt of sales, while the 
manufacturing tax was based on the value of the manufactured prod-
uct.169 Washington provided a "multiple activities exception" under 
which local manufacturers were exempt from the manufacturing tax 
to the extent that their output was subject to the wholesale taxPO As 
a result, local manufacturers paid the wholesale tax on local sales and 
the manufacturing tax on out-of-state sales, while out-of-state sellers 
paid the wholesale tax on goods sold in Washington.l7l The manufac-
turing and wholesale taxes were an identical .44%.172 
The Supreme Court in Tyler Pipe found the Washington tax dis-
criminatory because the "multiple activities exception" provided that 
the manufacturing tax was assessed only on goods produced in Wash-
165 See Armco, 303 S.E.2d at 717. The West Virginia Supreme Court determined that "our 
situation is more analogous to Alaska v. Arctic Maid . .. " and concluded that "we do not believe 
that under Alaska v. Arctic Maid, a showing of discrimination has been made between these 
two different taxes as they relate to interstate commerce." Id.; see also Lathrop, supra note 
151, at 559. 
166 See Judson & Duffy, supra note 161, at 739-40. Commentators, criticizing the invocation of 
internal consistency, termed this "an apparent 'belt and suspenders' line of reasoning." Id. at 
739. They asserted that: 
discrimination does not depend on whatever tax system another state or local jurisdic-
tion might establish; it depends upon the effect of the taxing scheme of the jurisdiction 
which is under taxpayer attack. Discrimination cannot be established by reference to 
what others do but instead must be established by reference to the actions of the taxing 
authority which are under challenge. 
Id. at 739-40. 
167 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 648 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
168 See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 232-33 
(1987). 
169 I d. at 235. 
17°Id. at 235 n.5. 
171 Id. at 235. 
172 See id. at 237. 
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ington and sold out of state.!7a The exemption from the manufacturing 
tax for local manufacturers who paid the wholesale tax was similar to 
the West Virginia tax that the Court found unconstitutional in Armco, 
Inc. v. Hardesty.174 
The Court also determined that payment of the manufacturing tax 
on out-of-state sales did not compensate for the wholesale tax paid on 
in-state sales because there was no identification of the burdens 
for which the state was seeking compensation.175 Manufacturing 
and wholesaling were not substantially equivalent events.176 The 
Court held that the Washington tax scheme provided a tax break to 
local manufacturers who sold in state, but placed interstate commerce 
at a disadvantage.177 Furthermore, the Court decided that the Wash-
ington tax was not internally consistent.17s The Washington tax 
scheme posed the possibility of double taxation to an out-of-state 
business selling in Washington that was required to pay a manufac-
turing tax to its home state. The only way to cure these defects was 
to ensure the deductibility of any manufacturing or wholesale tax paid 
to any state.179 
The Court should have upheld the Washington tax under the pur-
poses and effects test. ISO The tax was designed to avoid double taxa-
tion of in-state businesses. In-state businesses were relieved from 
paying the manufacturing tax to the extent that they paid the whole-
sale tax, which all businesses paid equally. In-state businesses only 
paid the manufacturing tax on exported goods, while out-of-state 
businesses were free from paying any manufacturing tax.181 Further-
173 Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffrey Kilduff, The "Internal Consistency" Test is 
Alive and Well: Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue, 41 TAX LAW. 
587, 587 (1987). 
174 See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 239-42. 
175 See id. at 244 n.12. 
176Id. at 244. 
177Id. at 248, 253. 
178 See supra notes 156--57 and accompanying text. 
179 Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 245-47. One commentator explained that, "[cJontrary to the Court's 
assertion, until Tyler Pipe, a reduction in the use tax for a sales tax paid to another state was 
not viewed as constitutionally mandated." Shores, supra note 151, at 583--86. 
180 See National Can Corp. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 732 P.2d 134, 134-35 (Wash. 1986). The 
Washington Supreme Court found that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause. See 
id.; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
181 See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 243. One commentator observed that: 
[iJf the Court had applied the discrimination doctrine (as it traditionally has done) to 
require substantial equality of treatment for interstate and intrastate transactions 
under the tax laws of a given state looked at in isolation, the Court would have held 
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more, the internal consistency requirement,J82 which was "nowhere to 
be found in the Constitution,"183 should not have been invoked.l84 State 
taxes should be judged on their own merits, not "on the basis of 
assumptions as to what other States might dO."185 Such assumptions 
would deny state legislatures the freedom to design their own taxing 
schemes.186 
The last significant compensatory tax case, decided in 1987, Ameri-
can Trucking Associations v. Scheiner, involved Pennsylvania stat-
utes that imposed lump-sum annual taxes on the operation of trucks 
on Pennsylvania highways.187 One statute required that an identifica-
tion marker be affixed to every truck over a specified weight at an 
annual charge of $25 from 1980 to 1982.188 The statute exempted 
trucks registered in Pennsylvania by making the marker fee part of 
the general registration fee which was increased by $25 when the 
marker fee was established.189 In 1982, the marker fee was reduced to 
$5 when Pennsylvania enacted a second statute which imposed an 
annual axle fee of $36 per axle on all trucks over a specified weight 
using state highways.l90 The second statute also reduced Pennsylvania 
registration fees for classes of vehicles weighing more than 26,000 
pounds by the same amount.191 
The Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania statutes were dis-
criminatory and not internally consistent.192 Since out-of-state trucks 
did not use Pennsylvania roads to the same extent as in-state trucks, 
out-of-state trucks were paying five times more per mile than in-state 
the Washington statute nondiscriminatory. Interstate and intrastate transactions were 
treated evenhandedly under the Washington tax scheme. 
Shores, supra note 151, at 596--97. 
182 See supra notes 156--57 and accompanying text. 
183 Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 254 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1"4 In dissent, Justice Scalia noted that when a "tax is assessed not on unitary income but on 
discrete events such as sale, manufacture, and delivery, which can occur in a single State or in 
different States, that apportionment principle is not applicable; there is simply no unitary figure 
or event to apportion." Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
185Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
186 See id. at 258-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 269 (1987). 
188 Id. at 273-74. 
189Id. 
190 Id. at 274. 
191 Id. 
192 American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 286--87. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held that 
the statutes did not violate the Commerce Clause. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 509 
A.2d 838, 849-55 (Pa. 1986), rev'd 483 U.S. 266 (1987); see supra notes 156-57 and accompanying 
text. 
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trucks.193 Furthermore, if other states retaliated by imposing fiat 
taxes, the taxes would disrupt interstate commerce.l94 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, voiced 
opposition to internal consistency tests, asserting that the fees should 
be upheld because the fees were applied equally to both in-state and 
out-of-state trucks.195 Addressing an issue ignored by the majority, 
the dissent argued that the reduction in the Pennsylvania registration 
fee caused by the payment of the axle fee did not violate the Com-
merce Clause because both fees were independent and nondiscrimi-
natory.l96 
Likewise, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Powell, in dissent, refused to view internal consistency as the 
constitutional yardstick by which to measure state taxes under the 
Commerce Clause.197 Justice O'Connor asserted that internal consis-
tency should be applied only to state taxes that were facially discrimi-
natory.198 Justice O'Connor noted that "creating an 'internal consis-
tency' rule of general application [was] an entirely novel enterprise 
that the Court undertakes for the first time in this case."l99 Justice 
O'Connor concluded that there was "no reason why such a rule is 
necessary or desirable."2°O 
This review of caselaw suggests that the Supreme Court has taken 
a detour by imposing the substantially equivalent events and internal 
consistency standards on compensatory state taxes.201 The Court 
should return to the purposes and effects test to determine the valid-
ity of compensatory taxes. The purpose of the state taxing statute 
and its effect in relation to the state's entire taxing scheme should be 
determinative. The Court should ensure that in-state residents are 
not benefitted at the expense of out-of-state concerns. This does not 
mean, however, that in-state residents should subsidize out-of-state 
concerns. Furthermore, the Court should abandon its internal consis-
193 American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 276. 
194 [d. at 284-87. 
195 [d. at 304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196 [d. at 304-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197 [d. at 303. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
198 American Trucking,483 U.S. at 303 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
199 [d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
200 [d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
201 One commentator noted that, ''the phrase 'substantially equivalent events' used by Armco 
as the touchstone for determining the complementary nature of two or more taxes appears to 
be something of an accordion term that can be expanded or contracted as the Court thinks the 
situation warrants." HARTMAN, supra note 109, at 30. 
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tency standard, which rests on legal abstractions and fails to examine 
actual state tax burdens.202 
Utilizing the purposes and effects conceptual framework, the Ore-
gon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality 
Court should have found that the Oregon law provided for an even-
handed treatment of in-state and out-of-state residents. The Oregon 
surcharge was designed to have out-of-state residents pay the same 
amount as in-state residents for the safe disposal of municipal solid 
wastes.203 The Oregon surcharge also guaranteed that in-state resi-
dents were not subsidizing the loss of a resource which the state 
helped to create.204 
Some evidentiary questions, such as disproportionality of the sur-
charge, were addressed neither by the Oregon courts because of the 
procedural posture of the case,205 nor by the United States Supreme 
Court because of its finding of facial discrimination.206 The courts 
should have addressed whether the components of the out-of-state 
surcharge were actually costs paid for by in-state residents through 
general revenues generated by the state income tax.207 If such costs 
202 One commentator noted that: 
[t]he 'internal consistency' approach is not appropriate for a gross receipts tax case 
and, in fact, relate[s] only to the formulary element of the apportioned net income tax. 
This confusing and somewhat baffling approach will open the flood gates to all manner 
of challenges under the Commerce Clause through mere speculation that some other 
state might enact a tax structure which would result in impermissible discrimination. 
Lathrop, supra note 151, at 557. 
208 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 
1358-59 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
204 [d. at 1355, 1358-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
205 The case was originally brought in the Oregon Court of Appeals as a challenge to the EQC's 
rules governing the disposal of solid waste. The court only could declare the rule invalid if it 
"(a) violates constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the statutory authority of the agency; or (c) 
was adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures." OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 183.400(4). The Oregon Supreme Court noted that: 
[o]ur scope of review under ORS § 183.400 precludes us from deciding whether the 
surcharge is impermissible as 'disproportionate' to the services rendered or to the costs 
incurred by the State of Oregon in connection with permitting waste disposal sites to 
accept solid waste generated out of state, because those are factual inquires. As this 
court noted ... 'judicial review under ORS § 183.400 is limited to the face of the rule 
and the law pertinent to it. Numerous individual fact situations can arise under any 
rule, but judicial review of the rule as applied to each of those situations is reserved 
to other forums.' Similarly, petitioners' claim of disproportionality may not be ad-
dressed in this proceeding under ORS § 183.400. 
Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 508-09 (Or. 1993) (citation omit-
ted). 
206 Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1350. 
207 The surcharge imposed by Oregon was comprised of the following identified costs: 
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were incurred, Oregon was entitled to the recovery of these costs 
through the surcharge on out-of-state waste. 
B. Legitimate State Interests 
The second threshold question before applying the Pike balancing 
test is whether a statute advances a legitimate state interest.208 Under 
the Tenth Amendment, states retain their police powers to act for the 
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens and for the protection of 
the environment.209 In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Hol-
mes found that a state in its sovereign capacity "has an interest 
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and 
air within its domain."210 Similarly, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
(1) Statewide activities for reducing environmental risk and improving solid waste 
management-$.58 per ton. According to the Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ), $.42 of this equaled the amount of general fund revenues allocated to 
solid waste programs, including $.10 for domestic waste reduction activity, $.08 for 
administering regulatory programs, and $.08 for statewide solid waste management 
planning. The remaining $.16 was allocable to the portion of the $.50 fee previously 
assessed on domestic waste, monies similarly dedicated to waste reduction and recy-
cling, groundwater monitoring, and planning activities by and grants to local govern-
ment units for disposal and recycling. 
(2) Reimbursements to the state for tax credits and other public subsidies-$.66 
per ton. 
(3) Solid waste reduction activities related to the review and certification of waste 
reduction and recycling plans-$.05 per ton. This charge apparently included the cost 
of reviewing waste reduction and recycling plans of sending jurisdictions. 
(4) Increased environmentalliability-$.72 per ton. Although the DEQ estimated the 
likelihood of petitioners' responsibility for $50 million worth of unfunded environmental 
liability at one tenth of one per cent, the EQC calculated this charge assuming a 100% 
probability of a $90 million cleanup. 
(5) Lost disposal capacity-$.20 per ton. This component included environmental stud-
ies and political deliberations associated with siting new landfills. 
(6) Publicly supported infrastructure-$.03 per ton. Among the costs comprising this 
category were highway maintenance, additional rail crossings, and increased traffic 
patrolling. 
(7) Nuisance impacts from transportation-$.01 per ton. The DEQ conceded that the 
use of traffic accident statistics gleaned from records were the proxy for measuring 
loss of quiet enjoyment. 
Brief of Petitioner Columbia Resource Company, L.P. at 6-7, Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. 
v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (Nos. 93-70 and 
93-108); see also Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
208 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
209 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: "[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people." 
210 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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Creamery Co., Justice Brennan recognized "the substantial state in-
terest in promoting conservation of energy and other natural re-
sources and easing solid waste disposal problems."211 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has confirmed that the Commerce Clause did not 
"cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the 
health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might 
indirectly affect the commerce of the country."212 The Commerce 
Clause may restrain, but does not preclude, a state's authority to 
protect the environment.213 
Solid waste collection, handling, transport, storage, and disposal 
pose serious environmental, health, and safety concerns that states 
must address.214 Landfills produce leachate, a noxious and highly pol-
luted liquid that frequently pollutes ground and surface waters.215 The 
decomposition of solid waste at landfills produces methane, which 
poses a risk of explosions.216 Rodents and scavenger birds attracted 
to landfills pose additional health hazards.217 Furthermore, landfills 
preclude the possibility of preserving the site for conservation, ad-
versely affect aesthetics and ecological balance, and limit future de-
velopment of the property.218 
Congress has explicitly recognized the potential dangers to public 
health from the land disposal of solid waste.219 The Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) states that the "disposal of solid 
waste and hazardous waste in or on the land without careful planning 
and management can present a danger to human health and the 
211 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981). 
212 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960) (quoting Sherlock v. 
Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876». 
213 The Court in Maine v. Taylor stated that: 
the Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate 
or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade 
above all other values. As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade 
or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,' . . . it retains broad 
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity 
of its natural resources. 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). 
214 See City ofPhlladelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). 
215 [d. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
216 [d. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
217 [d. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
218 Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 293 A.2d 426, 
428 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972). 
219 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629-30 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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environment."220 RCRA also recognized that "open dumping is par-
ticularly harmful to health, contaminates drinking water from under-
ground and surface supplies, and pollutes the air and the land."22l 
Oregon attempted to address the problems associated with the dis-
posal of municipal solid waste with statutes that were part of a com-
prehensive plan to protect the environment. Oregon simply sought to 
make out-of-state producers pay the same amount as in-state resi-
dents for the disposal of municipal solid waste.222 This plan constituted 
a legitimate exercise of Oregon's police power to protect the health 
and safety of Oregon citizens and to preserve the environment. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a statute that imposes a 
compensatory fee is "not a burden upon, or regulation of, interstate 
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause."223 On the contrary, 
"a law imposing a compensatory fee for costs incurred by a state in 
supervising and regulating the activities of an entity engaged in in-
terstate commerce is prima facie reasonable."224 Such a law only will 
be overturned if the fee is "manifestly disproportionate to the services 
rendered."225 
In Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, for instance, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a Tennessee statute that imposed a tax on compa-
nies operating interstate motorbuses on state highways.226 The Court 
noted that the state "may impose even upon motor vehicles engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce a charge, as compensation for the 
use of the public highways, which is a fair contribution to the cost 
of constructing and maintaining them and of regulating traffic 
220 42 u.s.c. § 6901(b)(2) (1988). 
221 [d. § 6901(b)(4). 
222 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that, "[t]he Court's 
myopic focus on 'differential fees' ignores the fact that in-state producers of solid waste support 
the Oregon regulatory program through state income taxes and by paying, indirectly, the 
numerous fees imposed on landfill operators and the dumping fee on in-state waste." [d. 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
223 Great N. Ry. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154, 160 (1937). 
224 Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 508 (Or. 1993). 
225 [d. (quoting Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 599 (1939»; see also Evansville-Vander-
burgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 720 (1972) (upholding fees which 
were not excessive in relation to the costs incurred and which represented a fair approximation 
of the use of facilities); Ingles v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 294 (1936) (holding that a fee which was 
designed as "reimbursement for the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations 
of the commerce" did not violate the Commerce Clause). 
226 Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 185 (1931). 
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thereon."227 Such a tax must be "levied only as compensation for use of 
the highways or to defray the expense of regulating motor traffic."228 
The tax would be "sustained unless the taxpayer shows that it bears 
no reasonable relation to the privilege of using the highways or is 
discriminatory."229 
In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., the Court upheld a caravaning fee 
imposed on each automobile traveling on state highways destined for 
sale either within or without California.230 The fee was designed "to 
reimburse the State for expenses incurred in administering police 
regulations" regarding this activity and as "compensation for the 
privilege of using the public highway."231 However, the law exempted 
cars moved exclusively within one of two zones that were roughly 
defined as the northern and southern halves of California.232 The Court 
found that the distinction between intrazone and interzone traffic was 
permissible because California incurred costs regarding the manage-
ment of interzone traffic which were already being paid by intrazone 
traffic.233 Furthermore, the fee was not "manifestly disproportionate 
to the services rendered."234 
In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental 
Quality, however, the Supreme Court disregarded the compensatory 
fee cases, stating that they only applied to "charge[s] imposed by the 
State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation or 
other facilities and services."235 The Court held that because the 
landfills in question were privately owned, "the out-of-state surcharge 
is plainly not a user fee."236 Even if the surcharge could be viewed as 
a user fee, it still could not be sustained because it discriminated 
against interstate commerce.237 
227 [d. 
228 [d. at 186. 
229 [d. The Court, however, invalidated the tax because it was not "predicated upon the use 
made, or to be made, of the highways of the state." [d. at 190. The tax was "proportioned solely 
to the earning capacity of the vehicle." [d. As such, there was "no sufficient relation between 
the measure employed and the extent or manner of use to justify holding that the tax was a 
charge made merely as compensation for the use of the highways by interstate busses." [d. 
230 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 598 (1939). 
231 [d. at 586. 
232 [d. at 586-87. 
233 [d. at 595-98. 
234 [d. at 599. 
235 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1352 
n.6 (1994) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981)). 
236 [d. 
237 [d. 
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The Oregon Waste Systems Court failed to recognize the nature of 
solid waste disposal. Landfills and incinerators come into existence 
through governmental action and are regulated by the state even 
after they are closed. The Oregon laws were not designed to regulate 
conduct or impose taxes to support the government; they were based 
on and applied to providing a narrow range of state services that were 
directly connected to the activity on which the fee was imposed.238 
Furthermore, Oregon's $2.25 per ton fee was a "'fair approximation' 
of the privilege to use its landfills."239 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in 
dissent, correctly noted that precedents only required "substantial 
equivalency" between the fees charged on in-state and out-of-state 
waste.240 
C. Benefits and Costs 
Since the Oregon laws were evenhanded and advanced a legitimate 
local interest, the Oregon Waste Systems Court should have utilized 
the Pike balancing test, which requires that putative local benefits 
exceed any burdens imposed on interstate commerce.241 
Oregon comprehensively regulates the disposal of solid waste 
within the state.242 For example, a state permit is required to operate 
a solid waste disposal site.243 The site must be operated in accordance 
with the governing laws and regulations and terms specified in the 
permit.244 The types of materials that may be disposed of at such a 
facility are limited by Oregon law.245 When disposal operations are 
238 Gilliam County v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 837 P.2d 955, 975-76 n.19 (1992). 
239 Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1358 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Common-
wealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 621). 
24°Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Evansville-Vanderburgh 
Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., in which the Court stated: 
[a]t least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for 
use, ... and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in 
comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, 
even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state 
facilities by individual users. 
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1972). 
241 See supra note 28. 
242 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that Oregon should be applauded for "responsibly 
attempt[ing] to address its solid waste disposal problem through the enactment of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme for the management, disposal, reduction, and recycling of solid 
waste." Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1355 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
243 OR. REV. STAT. § 459.205 (1992). 
244 Id. § 459.376 (1992). 
245Id. § 459.247 (1992). 
74 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:43 
completed at a site, the owner must close the site and maintain it in 
accordance with specified standards.246 These statutory provisions are 
supplemented by extensive regulations.247 Oregon charges a number 
of different fees in connection with the regulation of solid waste 
disposal, including a permit application fee248 and annual fees for im-
plementing program compliance,249 for recycling,250 and for the re-
moval of hazardous substances at solid waste disposal sites.251 Fur-
thermore, the county in which a disposal site is located may also 
impose a fee.252 
In 1989, Oregon enacted two laws, to become effective in 1991, 
which provided that every person who disposes of solid waste gener-
ated out-of-state must pay a surcharge to help meet the cost to the 
state of administering the solid waste program.253 The Oregon Envi-
ronmental Quality Commission (EQC) set the surcharge for out-of-
state waste at $2.25 per ton.254 The Oregon legislature established a 
surcharge on the disposal of in-state solid waste at $.85 per ton.255 
Oregon asserted that the difference in fees compensated the state for 
the costs of solid waste disposal paid by in-state residents through 
their state income tax. 
246Id. §§ 459.268, 459.270 (1992). 
247 OR. ADMIN. R. 340--93-97 (1993). 
248 This fee "shall be based on the anticipated cost of filing and investigating the application, 
of issuing or denying the requested permit and of an inspection program to determine compli-
ance or noncompliance with the permit." OR. REV. STAT. § 459.235(2) (1992). The fee ranges from 
$100 to $10,000 for solid waste disposal. Id. 
249 The fee is "based on the amount of solid waste received at the disposal site in the previous 
calendar year," OR. REV. STAT. § 459.235(3), and is fixed at $.21 per ton for landfills. OR. ADMIN. 
R. 340--97-120(4). 
250 This fee is set at $.09 per ton. OR. ADMIN. R. 340--97-120(4). 
251 The fee, OR. REV. STAT. § 459.236 (1992), is set at $.13 per ton. OR. ADMIN. R. 340--97-
120(5)(d). 
252 The amount of this fee is negotiated between the county and the site operator; in the 
absence of an agreement, the statute provides for a formula based on the number of tons of 
waste disposed of at the site. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.310 (1992). 
253 OR. REV. STAT. § 459.297. 
254 OR. ADMIN. R. 340--97-120(7). The EQC initially adopted a fee of $2.75 per ton, but that 
regulation was disapproved by the state Emergency Board. OR REV. STAT. § 459.298 (requiring 
Emergency Board approval during the interim between sessions of the rule promulgated by the 
EQC). 
255 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459A.110(5), 459A.115. Concerned that courts would invalidate the 
surcharge on out-of-state waste and leave only in-state solid waste subject to the additional 
levy, the Oregon legislature in 1991 amended the statute to subject out-of-state waste to the 
same $.85 per ton charge as in-state waste. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.110(6). This fee was added to 
the $2.25 per ton fee, which was left in place. If the $2.25 per ton fee was upheld by courts, the 
$.85 per ton fee would again be limited to Oregon waste. 1991 Or. Laws, ch. 385, §§ 91-92; Brief 
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Oregon determined that since the benefits of safe solid waste dis-
posal accrued to all Oregon citizens, costs should be spread among all 
citizens through the state income tax and the surcharge on the deposit 
of solid waste generated within the state.256 Oregon assured that 
adequate landfill capacity would be available and promulgated regu-
lations for the safe disposal of solid waste. Oregon could not tax 
out-of-state residents to fund its solid waste disposal program. Ore-
gon did not prohibit the importation of solid waste, but simply at-
tempted to charge out-of-state residents the same amount as in-state 
residents for disposal of solid waste. Consequently, Oregon residents 
would not be subsidizing the depletion of a state-created resource.257 
The Supreme Court has recognized that states can impose reason-
able restrictions on out-of-state residents' use of publicly created 
resources.258 In 1982, the Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska, reviewed a 
Nebraska law designed to reserve the state's groundwater for N e-
braska citizens in times of shortage by requiring that any withdrawal 
be reasonable, consistent with the state's conservation policy, and 
not detrimental to public policy.259 The Court recognized that the Ne-
braska law treated in-state and out-of-state residents differently.2OO 
Nevertheless, since both intrastate and interstate transfers of 
groundwater were highly regulated, the Court found no discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce.261 Consequently, the Court utilized 
of Respondent Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. at 27-28, Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of 
Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (Nos. 93-70 and 93-108). 
256 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1353 
(1994). The Court rejected this argument stating that, "to give controlling effect to respondent's 
characterization of Oregon's tax scheme as seemingly benign cost-spreading would require us 
to overlook the fact that the scheme necessarily incorporates a protectionist objective as well." 
[d. at 1354. 
257 [d. at 1357-58 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that: 
Congress also has recognized taxes as an effective method of discouraging consumption 
of natural resources in other contexts ... (tax on ozone-depleting chemicals) ... (gas 
guzzler excise tax). . . . Nothing should change the analysis when the natural re-
source-landfill space-was created or regulated by the State in the first place. 
[d. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
258 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982). 
259 [d. at 944. The Court in Oregon Waste Systems narrowly interpreted its previous Sporhase 
decision, stating: 
that holding was premised on several different factors tied to the simple fact of life 
that, 'water, unlike other natural resources, is essential for human survival.' Sporhase 
therefor provides no support for respondents' position that the States may erect a 
financial barrier to the flow of waste from other states into Oregon landfills. 
Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1354 (citation omitted). 
260 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955. 
261 [d. at 955-56. The Court stated that: 
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the Pike balancing test to evaluate the nondiscriminatory aspects of 
the Nebraska law.262 
The Court found that it was reasonable for Nebraska to conserve 
its natural resources for use by its own citizens during times of 
shortage for several reasons.263 First, Nebraska had the right to regu-
late groundwater transfers to protect the health of its citizens.264 
Second, Nebraska had a reasonable expectation that under certain 
conditions it could restrict the groundwater within its borders.265 
Third, although Nebraska's assertion of limited public ownership 
did not preclude Commerce Clause scrutiny, it might support a lim-
ited preference for Nebraska's residents.266 Finally, given Nebraska's 
conservation efforts, the continued existence of groundwater was 
not just happenstance. The groundwater had the "indicia of a good 
publicly produced and owned in which the state may favor its own 
citizens."267 
The Oregon laws at issue in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality were comparable in many respects 
to the Nebraska law.268 First, similar to the purposes of the Nebraska 
law, the Oregon laws were designed to protect the health and safety 
of Oregon's citizens and the environment by dealing with Oregon's 
Id. 
a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not 
discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled 
transfer of water out of the State. An exemption for interstate transfers would be 
inconsistent with the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation. 
262 Id. at 954-57. The Nebraska law also provided that groundwater could not be exported to 
any state which lacked a reciprocity agreement with Nebraska. The Court, applying the strict 
scrutiny test to this provision, determined that the reciprocity violated the Commerce Clause 
because it erected a barrier to interstate commerce and was not narrowly tailored to meet the 
goals of conservation. Id. at 957-58. 
263 I d. at 956. 
264 Id. 
265 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956. 
266 Id. at 955-57. 
267Id. at 957. 
268 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that "in Sporhase 
v. Nebraska . .. a State may enact a comprehensive regulatory system to address an environ-
mental problem or a threat to natural resources within the confines of the Commerce Clause." 
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Analogizing Nebraska's restrictions on 
groundwater to Oregon's concerns with a "clean and safe environment," Chief Justice Rehnquist 
stated that, "where a State imposes restrictions on the ability of its own citizens to dispose of 
solid waste in an effort to promote a 'clean and safe environment,' it is not discriminating against 
interstate commerce by preventing the uncontrolled transfer of out-of-state solid waste into the 
State." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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solid waste disposal problem.269 Second, the Oregon laws and the 
Nebraska law were both enacted by lawmakers who legitimately 
expected that they possessed authority over the area regulated. 
RCRA recognizes that "the collection and disposal of solid waste 
should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and 
local agencies."270 RCRA requires the EPA to establish guidelines for 
the development of state or regional solid waste management plans, 
authorizes the funding of such plans, and encourages states to develop 
such plans to manage their own solid waste.271 The states are given 
broad discretion to fashion plans that comply with EPA guidelines.272 
RCRA implies that states should have some control over the impor-
tation of solid waste.273 Otherwise, a state's solid waste plan could be 
frustrated by an increase in the amount of imported waste. 
Another issue in common in the Oregon and Nebraska cases is that, 
like groundwater transfers, solid waste disposal is a highly regulated 
industry performing a traditional governmental function.274 Oregon's 
rigorous oversight of this private industry was analogous to N e-
braska's limited property interest in its groundwater. Finally, landfills 
are not natural resources which appear by happenstance, but are 
269Id. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist detennined, in dissent, 
that, "[t]he availability of environmentally sound landfill space and the proper disposal of solid 
waste strike me as justifiable 'safety or health' rationales for the fee." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
270 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4). 
27142 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49 (1988); see also Keith E. Johnston, Comment, State Embargo of Solid 
Waste: Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution to a Pressing Problem?, 82 DICK. L. REV. 
325, 329-33 (1978). 
272 H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 33-35 (1976). 
273 See Allen J. Danzig, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's 
Options After the Philadelphia Decision, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 31, 34-36 (1979). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that: 
Congress itself has recognized the need for the development of comprehensive state 
plans for solid waste disposal and implicitly this requires the planned management of 
waste flow. Congress has there expressed a strong policy preference for resource 
recovery. Resource recovery cannot be accomplished if waste streams are not directed. 
The court order here recognizes local responsibilities . . . that clearly require inte-
grated planning. 
Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 485 A.2d 299, 303 (N.J. 1984) 
(citation omitted). 
274 Courts have recognized that the "[c]ontrol of local sanitation, including garbage collection 
and disposal, ... is a traditional, paradigmatic example of the exercise of municipal police powers 
reserved to state and local governments under the Tenth Amendment." Hybud Equip. Corp. v. 
City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1192 (6th Cir. 1981); see also California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary 
Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318--19 (1905); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 331 (1905); 
State ex rel. Moock v. City of Cincinnati, 163 N.E. 583, 583 (Ohio 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 
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engineered facilities which require liners, leachate collectors, and op-
erating systems.275 The existence of adequate and safe solid waste 
disposal facilities was the result of the state's efforts.276 The landfill 
facilities in Oregon, like the groundwater in Nebraska, were goods 
publicly produced to which the state could grant preference to its own 
citizens.277 If Oregon allowed out-of-state solid waste disposal at a cost 
less than in-state disposal, Oregon citizens would be subsidizing the 
exhaustion of Oregon's own publicly created resource.278 
The Oregon laws did not pose undue burdens on other states.279 The 
financial burden imposed on out-of-state waste generators was a mere 
$.14 per week.280 This was a small price to pay for dumping trash in a 
neighboring state's backyard, especially in light of the shortage of 
landfill capacity.281 
578 (1929); Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste Management and the Constitution's Commerce Clause, 
25 URB. 21 (1993). 
275 Stanley E. Cox, Burying Misconceptions About Trash and Commerce: Why It Is Time to 
Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991); see also Swin Resource 
Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1989). 
276 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent 
that: 
[t]he availability of safe landfill disposal sites in Oregon did not occur by chance. 
Through its regulatory scheme, the State of Oregon inspects landfill sites, monitors 
waste streams, promotes recycling, and imposes an $0.85 per ton disposal fee on 
in-state waste, all in an effort to curb the threat that its residents will harm the 
environment and create health and safety problems through excessive and unmoni-
tored solid waste disposal. 
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
277 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
278Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that: 
[d]epletion of a clean and safe environment will follow if Oregon must accept out-of-
state waste at its landfills without a sharing of the disposal costs. The Commerce 
Clause does not require a State to abide this outcome where the 'natural resource has 
some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own 
citizens in times of shortage.' 
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
279 There was a risk of some multiple taxation under the Oregon scheme. Out-of-state resi-
dents who worked in Oregon were charged twice for the disposal of their municipal solid waste. 
They paid first through the Oregon income tax and second through the higher out-of-state 
surcharge. However, this double taxation should not impair the Oregon program because 
out-of-state residents who pay the Oregon income tax also partly fund the Oregon Game and 
Fish Department, while still paying higher fees to hunt and fish in Oregon. Steve Yarbrough, 
Casenote, Compensatory Fee or Protectionist Tax: Oregon's Surcharge on Out-oj-State Waste, 
34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 497, 504 n.59 (1994). 
280 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 
n.2 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
281 The NGA noted: 
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The burden that the Oregon laws did impose on exporting states 
was that these states would have to assume greater responsibility for 
the disposal of their solid waste. If Oregon could create the landfill 
capacity, so could other states. Geography imposes only limited con-
straints on the siting of landfills, which can be located in any state.282 
The landfill shortage stems from the fact that some states, mostly due 
to political pressures, have failed to meet their municipal obligations 
to site such facilities. These states should not be able to transfer their 
burden to states like Oregon that have a rational and timely program 
to deal with solid waste disposal. In his dissent in Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stressed, "I see nothing in the Commerce Clause that 
compels less densely populated States to serve as the low-cost dump-
ing grounds for their neighbors, suffering the attendant risks that 
solid waste landfills present."283 
The Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., held that where 
a legitimate local purpose exists, the question of placing a burden on 
interstate commerce was a matter of degree.284 The Court stated that, 
"the extent of the burden tolerated will of course depend on the 
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."285 In 
Oregon Waste Systems, the imposition of the surcharge on the dis-
posal of out-of-state waste was the least restrictive alternative for 
Oregon to achieve its goals. The uniform fee urged by the petitioners 
in Oregon Waste Systems would not have allowed Oregon to structure 
its tax system to spread the costs incurred for the safe disposal of 
solid waste to its citizens, who were the direct beneficiaries of a clean 
environment.286 Furthermore, a uniform fee would act as a subsidy 
the lack of capacity due to landfill closing is exacerbated by the difficulty of listing new 
disposal facilities. Since 1980 fewer than 2,000 landfills have been sited in the U.S. 
While this might seem large, it translates into one in twenty local governments siting 
a landfill during the past decade. 
CURBING WASTE, supra note 6, at 40. 
282 See Cox, supra note 275, at 820-23; Jonathan Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage 
Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement As a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste 
Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 571-73 (1991). 
283 Oregon Waste Systems, 114 S. Ct. at 1358 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); accord Fort Gratiot 
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 371 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
284 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
285 Id. 
286 Reply Brief of Petitioner Columbia Resource Company, L.P. at 111-13, Oregon Waste Sys., 
Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _U.S._, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (Nos. 93-70 and 93-108). 
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from in-state residents to out-of-state disposers who did not pay for 
the costs of safe solid waste disposal through the state income tax. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION 
Given the Court's hostility to state efforts to manage solid waste 
disposal, Congress has been forced into the controversy regarding the 
interstate transport of municipal solid waste. Congress can immunize 
state actions that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.287 In 
1992, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works re-
ported a bill amending the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
including granting state governors the power to restrict the disposal 
of out-of-state waste.288 This bill was not considered by the full Senate. 
The Senate did, however, pass a bill entitled the Interstate Transpor-
tation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1992, which allowed state 
governors to prohibit or limit the importation of out-of-state munici-
pal solid waste upon the request of the local government.289 The House 
of Representatives, however, did not enact comparable legislation, 
and the bill died.290 
Similar efforts commenced in 1993.291 President Clinton expressed 
his support for a bill that would allow states to control the importation 
of solid waste.292 In the 103d Congress, nine bills were introduced into 
the House of Representatives that either prohibited the importation 
of solid waste or authorized additional fees for the disposal of out-of-
state solid waste.293 In the second session of the 103d Congress, the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee issued a report on the State 
and Local Government Interstate Waste Control Act of 1994 (the 
House bill),294 which was designed to reverse the Court's Fort Gratiot 
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Re-
287 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 
174-75 (1985). 
2R8 S. REP. No. 301, supra note 2, at 1, 72. 
289 S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Senate Passes Bill to Allow Governors to Restrict 
Interstate Transport of Garbage, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1099 (July 31, 1992). 
290 RCRA Bill Dies As Congress Nears Adjournment; Senator Says House 'Puts Politics 
Over Policy', 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1540 (Oct. 9, 1992). 
291 First Two Days of 103rd Congress See Introduction of No Environmental Bills, 23 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2352 (Jan. 15, 1993). 
292 See Coats, Wyder Join Forces On Bills to Allow State Bans of Waste Imports, 23 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2873 (Mar. 5, 1993). 
29:1 H.R. REP. No. 720, supra note 8, at 11. 
294 H.R. 4779, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
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sources decision.295 The House bill, which granted state and local 
governments some control over the importation of municipal solid 
waste, passed overwhelmingly by a vote of 368 to 55.296 
The House bill granted local governments primary authority to 
control the importation of solid waste.297 Landfills and incinerators 
needed permission from local governments to import out-of-state 
solid waste. Upon the request of local government, a state governor 
could limit the importation of out-of-state solid waste to the landfill 
or incinerator in the local jurisdiction to 1993 levels, with some excep-
tions.298 Furthermore, if a state imported more than 750,000 tons of 
municipal solid waste in 1993, the state could reduce, by defined 
percentages, the amount of municipal solid waste imported from ex-
porting states.299 
The House bill specifically addressed the problem presented in 
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality 
by allowing states to impose a surcharge for the disposal of some 
out-of-state solid waste.3OO The surcharge was based on the state's 
costs, but could not exceed $2 per ton. The state was required to 
show that 1) the costs were incurred; 2) without the surcharge 
the state's residents would be subsidizing the disposal of out-of-state 
solid waste; and 3) the costs were compensatory, not discriminatory.301 
Furthermore, the fee had to be invested in the state's solid waste 
program.302 
The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works took a 
different approach. The Committee issued a report on the Interstate 
Transportation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1994,303 which granted 
more authority to state governors.304 If requested by local govern-
ment, a governor could ban out-of-state municipal waste at landfills 
295 H.R. REP. No. 720, supra note 8, at 10; see Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan 
Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 367--68 (1992). 
296 140 CONGo REC. H9938-39 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994); House Passes Interstate Transport 
Bill After Reaching Compromise Among Factions, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1118-19 
(Sept. 30, 1994). 
297 H.R. REP. No. 720, supra note 8, at 12. 
298Id. at 17. 
299Id. at 14-18. 
300 Id. at 19. 
801Id. 
:102 H.R. REP. No. 720, supra note 8, at 19. 
:loa S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
304 S. REP. No. 322, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4--6 (1994). 
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and facilities that did not receive such waste in 1993.305 Under the bill, 
a governor could thus unilaterally freeze municipal solid waste im-
ports to landfills and facilities at 19931evels.306 Furthermore, a gover-
nor could decrease the flow of out-of-state municipal solid waste re-
ceived from any state exporting more than certain aggregate amounts 
of solid waste in designated years. A governor could also decrease the 
flow of out-of-state solid waste imported from any particular state if 
the imports from that state exceeded statutorily defined limits.307 The 
Senate passed the bill by a voice vote on September 30, 1994.308 
In the closing days of the 103d Congress in 1994, the House of 
Representatives worked out a compromise measure sponsored by 
Representative Al Swift (D-Wa.). Under the compromise, landfills and 
incinerators were barred from accepting out-of-state solid waste be-
ginning January 1, 1995, unless the local government took affirmative 
action to accept such waste.309 At the local government's request, the 
state governor could restrict the importation of out-of-state solid 
waste to 1993 levels. The House compromise included the Senate's 
provisions granting gubernatorial control regarding export and im-
port limitations on solid waste, as well as the cost-recovery surcharge 
provisions.31o On October 7,1994, the House approved the compromise 
bill.:m However, on October 8, 1994, the Senate rejected the compro-
mise measure.312 
Reconsideration of interstate waste restrictions began in the 104th 
Congress. On April 5, 1995, the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee issued a favorable report on the Interstate Trans-
portation of Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1995,313 which amends the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA).314 This bill grants state governors 
unilateral power to restrict the importation of municipal solid waste 
to 1993 levels and to ban future imports to facilities that did not 
receive such waste in 1993 at the request of the affected local commu-
:105 Id. at 4. 
:106 Id. at 4-5. 
:107 I d. at 6-12. 
:l(ji< Senate Passes Interstate Waste Bill; Prospects for Final Approval Uncertain, 25 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1148 (Oct. 7, 1994). 
"
09 140 CONGo REC. H11401 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). 
310 140 CONGo REC. H11403 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). 
:111 140 CONGo REC. H11398-407 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994). 
:112 Final Efforts on Interstate Transport, Municipal Floor-Control Measure Fall Short, 25 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1174-75 (Oct. 14, 1994). 
:lIB S. 534, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see generally S. REP. No. 52, supra note 7. 
:11442 U.S.C. §§ 6901-22k. 
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nity.3l5 The bill includes an import provision to ensure that no single 
state is forced to accept excessive amounts of municipal solid waste 
from any particular state,3l6 and an export provision that reduces the 
amount of solid waste exported from any particular state.317 Further-
more, the bill allows the states that charged additional fees for the 
disposal of out-of-state solid waste before April 3, 1994, to impose a 
fee of no more than $1 per ton as long as the fee is utilized to fund 
solid waste management programs administered by such states.3l8 
Although the import restrictions considered by the 103d and 104th 
Congresses are a step in the right direction, they do not go far enough. 
Under the SWDA,3l9 states are authorized to develop comprehensive 
solid waste management plans. Congress should amend the SWDA to 
allow states, as part of their solid waste management plans, to ban 
the disposal of out-of-state solid waste, or at least allow states to 
charge a greater fee for its disposa1.32o Congress followed a similar 
315 s. REP. No. 52, supra note 7, at 13. 
316 See id. at 10. Section 4011(a)(3)(A) allows a governor to unilaterally restrict out-of-state 
solid waste from anyone state in excess of the following levels: in 1996, more than 1.4 million 
tons or 90% of the 1993 levels of such waste exported to such state, whichever is greater; in 
1997, 1.3 million tons or 90% of the 1996 levels of such waste exported to such state, whichever 
is greater; in 1998, 1.2 million tons or 90% of the 1997 levels of such waste exported to such 
state, whichever is greater; in 1999, 1.1 million tons, or 90% of the 1998 levels of such waste 
exported to such state, whichever is greater; in 2000, 1 million tons; in 2001, 800,000 tons; and 
in 2002, and each year thereafter, 600,0000 tons. [d. 
317 See S. REP. No. 52, supra note 7, at 10. Section 4011(a)(3)(A) allows a governor to ban 
out-of-state municipal solid waste from any state exporting more than 3.5 million tons of 
municipal solid waste in 1996; 3 million tons in 1997 and 1998; 2.5 million tons in 1999 and 2000; 
1.5 million tons in 2001 and 2002; and 1 million tons of solid waste in 2003 and every year 
thereafter. [d. 
318 See S. REP. No. 52, supra note 7, at 16-17. Section 4011(d) provides grandfather authority 
for the imposition of cost recovery surcharges. The imposition of the surcharge is conditioned 
upon the state's ability to demonstrate that a differential cost arises from the processing of 
disposal of out-of-state waste, that such costs would otherwise have to be paid by the state, and 
that the surcharge is compensatory and not discriminatory. A state may not assess a surcharge 
if the cost that this surcharge is intended to cover is otherwise recovered by another surcharge 
or tax assessed against solid waste. The state bears the burden of proof that the fee satisfies 
the above conditions. [d. 
319 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-49a. 
320 The NGA recommended that: 
Congress should waive Commerce Clause restrictions and allow states to establish-
without prior approval-special fees on imported solid waste. The fees should be high 
enough that the waste exporter pays as much to export the waste as to dispose of it 
in-state, not including transportation expenses. If such a system fails to resolve inter-
state waste disputes, the federal government should examine other long-term options, 
including the use of arbitration, special fines on egregious waste exporters, and limits 
on the amount of waste states can ship beyond their borders. 
CURBING WASTE, supra note 6, at 35. 
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path before in a related area in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985,321 a law validated, in part, by the 
Supreme Court in New York v. United States.322 Congress similarly 
should employ this state-control approach to allow states to counter 
their waste problems. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department 
of Environmental Quality, like other battles in the waste war, utilized 
the dormant Commerce Clause to "tie the hands of the States in 
addressing the vexing national problem of solid waste disposal."323 The 
Court's decision will encourage out-of-state generators to "produce 
solid waste with reckless abandon and avoid paying concomitant state 
taxes to develop new landfills and clean up retired landfill sites."324 
The Court's decision also imposed a burden on Oregon citizens be-
cause "[t]hey alone will have to pay the 'nondisposal' fees associated 
with solid waste: landfill siting, landfill clean-up, insurance to cover 
environmental accidents, and transportation improvement costs asso-
ciated with out-of-state waste being shipped into the State."325 The 
Court thus presented states with a Hobson's choice: "become a dum-
per and ship as much waste as possible [in]to a less populated State, 
321 The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 requires the states, 
either individually or through regional compacts, to manage the disposal oflow level radioactive 
waste generated within their borders. The Act provides three incentives to encourage state 
compliance. First, states with disposal sites can impose a surcharge on the waste received from 
other states. The Secretary of Energy receives a percentage of the surcharge, which is dis-
pensed to the states after they achieve certain milestones in the development of their own 
radioactive waste disposal sites. Second, states with disposal sites can increase the cost of access 
to their sites, and eventually deny any access to the states not complying with the federal 
deadlines. Third, the states, failing to deal with the disposal of their internally generated low 
level radioactive wastes according to the federal guidelines, are required, upon request of the 
owners of the waste, to take title to and possession of the waste, or become liable for damages 
incurred by the generators resulting from the states' failure to take title. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 
99 Stat. 1842,42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988). 
322 In 1992, the Supreme Court, in New York v. United States, found that the monetary and 
access incentives were legitimate exercises of congressional Commerce Clause and Taxing and 
Spending Clause authority. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169-73 (1992). The Court, 
however, invalidated the take-title provisions, holding that they either exceeded Commerce 
Clause authority or intruded upon state sovereignty. [d. at 171-73. 
323 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, _ U.S. _,114 S. Ct. 1345, 
1355-56 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
324 See id. at 1357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
325 [d. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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or become a dumpee, and stoically accept waste from more densely 
populated States."326 
Congress must act in concert to settle the waste war. Congress 
should allow the states to ban out-of-state solid waste or charge a 
higher fee for its disposal. Otherwise, the states will "undoubtedly 
continue to search for a way to limit their risk from sites in opera-
tion."327 These efforts will generate additional litigation which will 
"work to the principal advantage only of those states that refuse to 
contribute to a solution."328 Ultimately, states must be allowed to 
legislate freely in the area of waste disposal and to develop palatable 
solutions to the shortage of available landfill. 
326Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
327 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 351 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
32ll Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
